Violence against wives : a crime 'sui generis' by Maboreke, M.
2 TMBARWRLAWREVIEW
EDITORIAL BOARD
Professor R.H.F. Austin, BA, LLB (Cape Town) LLM (London), Legal Practitioner.
A. K. Armstrong, AB (Brown) JD (Boston).
M. Cooney, BCL, (NUI), LLM (Harvard).
G. Feltoe, BA (Rhodes), LLB (London), M.Phil. (Kent), Legal Practitioner.
D.P. Galen, BA (Mich), JD (Yale), Supreme Court (USA).
S. B.O. Gutto, LLB (Nairobi), MALD (Tufts) Dip. Int & Comp Law of Human Rights 
(Strasbourg).
B. Hlatshwayo, BL (UZ), LLM (Harvard).
P. Lewin, BA (Rhodes), LLB (Cape Town), Legal Practitioner.
M. Maboreke, BL, M.Phil (UZ).
El Magade, BL, LLB, M.Phil (UZ).
K. Makamure, LLB, LLM (London).
P.R. Naidoo, BA, LawCert (Natal).
W. Ncube, BL, M.Phil (UZ).
T. J. Nyapadi, SRN, BL (South Bank), LLM (London).
P. Nherere, BL (UZ), LLM (Cambridge), BCL (Oxford).
S. Nzombe, BL (UZ),.LLM (London).
D.A.B. Robinson, BA (Cape Town), MA (Oxford) Legal Practitioner.
F.G. Smith, BL, LLB (Rhodesia), Dip AIA Eng, Legal Practitioner.
J.E. Stewart, LLB (London).
Issue Editors
A.K. ARMSTRONG, E. MAGADE AND S. NZOMBE
Faculty o f  Law 
University o f Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box MP 167
Harare
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Law Review Volume 137
Focus on Criminal L&& ia Southern Africa
Articles
Shaidi, L. P., Explaining Crime: A Marxist Perspective.
page
, . l
Mwansa, K. T.t The Status of African Customary Criminal Law and 
Justice under the Received English Criminal Law in Zambia:
A Case for the Integration of the Two Systems..... .i23
Mabirilzi, D.f Reflections on the Socio-Economic Content of
Medicine Murder in Lesotho........................ ........... .43
Feltoe, G., Extenuating Circumstances:' A Life and Death Issue....... 60,
Maboreke, M. Violence against Wives: A Crime sui generis.............88
Armstrong, A., Consent in Rape Cases in Swaziland:
A Woman's Right to Decide....^...................... ...... ...112
Gutto, S., The Law and Mass Rape during Armed Social Conflicts:
Lessons from the 1982 Coup Attempt in Kenya............... ...125
Frimpong, K., Some Observations on Botswana's Prison System.........136
Case Motes and Comment
Feltoe, G., Killing in Defence of Person............................ 149
Armstrong, A., Sentencing for Infanticide in Zimbabwe...... ........ 159
Stewart, J., The Legal Age of Majority Act Strikes Again...........168
Nherere, P., By Situs Alone. ^ .... ....................................173
Nzombe, S., Toss of the'Coin: Urban Councils Act or Labour
Relations Act...'......... ........................... .......... 183
Tshuma, L. Charged with and Convicted of Indecent Assault
but Sentenced for Rape........ ............................... 185
Book Reviews
Stewart, J., On Christie, .Business Law in Zimbabwe, Mac Coll,
First Year Business Law for Zimbabwean Students, and Bampton 
& Drury, Introduction to Zimbabwean Business Law............
THIS item  is m ot ava ilable
FuR LOAM AMD MAY MO7' BE 
REMOVED FROM THE 
LAW LIBRARY
188




Although most people "like to think of the family as the abode ui 
love; a safe retreat where any member of the family is sure of support 
and protection; of grandparents, parents, aunts, uncles, and children 
as a closely - linked network of individuals who will stand united in 
the face of a threat, the reality is rather different.
With specific reference to the problem of violence against wives 
within the Zimbabwean context it has been said:
"Everybody knows it exists. Everybody knows there is a great
deal of it. But nobody knows its extent. There are no 
, figures."2
It can be reasonably assumed that victims of this violence want 
to be protected from their husbands. This article examines the legal 
provisions governing violence against wives, their adequacy,
appropriateness and as well as their current implementation.
2. THE LEGAL POSITION
Under both customary 3 and common  ^ law the husband had the right
* Mary Maboreke is a lecturer in law at the University of Zimbabwe 
teaching Women's Law and Customary Law. This article is based on 
her M. Phil thesis, "The Legal Status of Women in Zimbabwe: The
Laws Relating to Violence Against Wives and Child Custody As 
Illustrations."
1. Storr, A. (1978) Family Violence: An International and
Interdisciplinary Study, Toronto, Butterworths, p. 1..
2. M. Maboreke's M.Phll Thesis, "The Legal Status of Women in 
Zimbabwe: The Laws Relating to Violence Against Wives and Child 
Custody As Illustrations", p. 38 See also, for instance, The 
Statement by the Minister of Community and Co-operative 
Development and Women's Affairs Mrs Joyce Mujuru in The Herald 
(Saturday 16th January) 1987.
3. (1975), Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom in Rhodesia 
Cape Town, Juta p. 18; and 1928-62 Bangake and Magenge v Slkobo, 
SRN 150; 1944 Shorlwa v. Rlsl and Mubaylwa, SRN 275.
4. Huber, Jurisprudence of My Time. Vol 1 p. 48; Grotius 1.5.19 and
20.
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to physically chastise his wife as a correctional measure or as a way 
of making her obey his lawful orders. This right appears to have been 
seen as proceeding from the husband's position as guardian of his 
wife, which, inter alia, made him responsible for his wife's 
liabilities to third parties. ^ This rationalisation apparently lent 
morality, respectability and apparent legality to violence against 
wives and in. effect operated to shield the husband from dispporabation 
for assaulting his wife - at least if the assault meted out was 
thought to be commensurate with the wrongs committed.
The Legal Age of Majority Act 15/82 conferred majority status on 
all persons of 18 years and above. This is particularly significant 
in relation to women because by doing so it removed the yoke of 
perpetual minority which had hitherto been the llnch pin of women's 
inferiority vis a vis their menfolk. In particular, the Legal Age of 
Majority Act removed the rationale for the husband's liability for the 
actions of his wife, at least to the extent that the liability was 
premised upon his being her guardian. This Act has also wiped out 
those consequences flowing from a husband's guardianship of his wife 
which might have formerly been seen as a justification for violence 
against wives. However, in marriages in community of property, 6 for 
example, the position of the husband as the administrator of the joint 
estate might still be seen as a justification for his continued right 
to direct her actions, thus clothing a husband's assaults upon his 
wife- to whom he is married in community of property with apparent 
legality and morality. There is, therefore, perhaps a need to review 
all laws which may in any way be construed as a legitimation or 
justification for violence against wives such as men's right to decide 
issues concerning women which in turn is indirectly used to justify 
violence against wives. Even this, however, may not suffice. To 
begin with, normative rules are but one of the structural determinants 
of behaviour and often a minor one at that; and Secondly, such rules 
do not arise out of thin air but rather are integrated with a network 
of other elements and usually reflect the realities of everyday 
living. Consequently, a truly fundamental approach to the problem of 
violence against wives must address these very fundamental issues each 
of which is almost inseparably intertwined with the others.
There is no Zimbabwean case authority saying that the husband's 
right to chastise his wife is no more. Nonetheless it is quite clear 
that this purported right is no more. ? There is nothing within the 
definition of criminal assault Indicating that violence against wives 
is in a class of its own. Further, an act cannot be both a right and 
criminal at the same time and husbands have been and are still being 
convicted for assaulting their wives something which would not be
possible if they had a right to chastise 
inconceivable that they would be convicted 
rights, The legal position is therefore tha 
is just as criminal as any other crime.
their wives for it is 
for exercising their 
t violence against wives
UNIVERSITY OF
LAW LIBRA..Y
5. Muchechesi v. Seven 1969 AACC 43. PERIODICALS - . ..... ___ .
6. Those marriages in which property acquired during the 
subsistence of the marriage is held In equal undivided shares by 
the spouses.
7. See e.g. Hunt, Southern African Criminal Law ahd Procedure, Vol 
II, p. 469.
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3. REMEDIES 
A. CUSTOMARY LAW
THE SOCIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The first remedy open to a wife who had been assaulted or was 
threatened with assault was an appeal to either her family of 
affinition or her own natural family. ® The homes of relatives also 
acted as refugees in times of need. In cases, where the wife sought 
refuge with a third party the onus was on the husband to follow her 
and after mediation by third parties the htisband would usually offer 
compensation in atonement for his actions. ^
Under customary law people who had a dispute usually tried to 
settle the matter between' themselves .and their families before 
resorting to the court which was usually used only as a last resort. 
In cases of violence against wives customary law provided a via media 
which was usually in the form of a "peace bond" of 6orts. What 
customary law did in this instance was to require the husband to make 
an undertaking to refrain from further violence upon his wife and this 
undertaking was made-a condition precedent to the parties’ resumption 
of married life or cohabitation. This was sanctioned by the threat of 
increased compensation for further assaults and/or a family instigated 
divorce.
The social dispute settlement process discussed above, however, 
depended upon the continued existence of an intact extended family 
system. The extended family system, an outgrowth of the communalism 
of feudal pre-colonial Zimbabwe is being overtaken by the 
individualism of the present-day capitalist Zimbabwean economy. 
Consequently, the social dispute settlement process discussed above 
finds itself more and more unable to adequately, satisfactorily and 
effectively deal with Issues arising from this Changed socio-economic 
base. This is why third parties and relatives to whom assaulted wives 
have turned for assistance are reportedly generally not very helpful. 
For instance, in Florence Mushambl v Ishmael Mushambl 1® the wife's 
brother repeatedly sent her back to her husband even though the latter 
had threatened to kill her; and in Agatha Gada v Lovemore Muchazlvepi 
H  the wife's unchallenged testimony was that after her husband had 
severely assaulted her on diverse occasions he took her to her uncle 
but her
"uncle refused to accept me for there was no munyal 1* . My 
brother in Glen Norah refused to accept me as well and we went 
round four times and the fifth time we went to my uncle (the 
husband) said,"Do you want me to bring your daughter in a 
coffin?” and this is when my uncle agreed to have me there". 8910
8. Shorlwa v Rlsl and Mubaylwa, 1944 SRN 275.
9. -Golden and Gelfand, op clt, Shorlwa v Rlsl and Mubaylwa, op clt.
10. Harare Conmunity Court, 30/85.
11. Harare Community Court 737/85.
. The person who acts as a go between between the wife-giving ; nd 
the wife-receiving families during marriage negotiations.
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This shows that whatever merits the social dispute settlement 
process might have had It Is becoming more and more futile to look to 
It for the resolution of disputes.
The social dispute settlement process falls to meet women's
need for protection for various other reasons. First, third party 
intervention, especially where It takes the form of Intervention by 
the extended family, is likely to be biased in favour of the party who 
is a member of that particular family. Since In most cases the woman 
is on the receiving end and she usually turns to her husband's family 
for assistance first. This factor is much more likely to operate 
against her rather than in her favour. Further, even in those cases 
where the wife turns to her own natural family for help, she might 
find that her family is reluctant to come to her aid lest they be 
.misconstrued as aiding and abetting her in the behaviour being 
complained of by her husband and/or his family, and thereby compromise 
their bargaining position should the whole affray escalate into an
inter-family conflict. In addition, even assuming that both a woman's
family of affinition and her natural one are not biased as a result of 
their relational Standings to the parties, their response to a woman's 
need for protection from a violent husband is still limited because it 
is already coloured by the apparent general societal acceptance of 
violence against wives as a social norm rather than as an aberration 
which needs ' correction. The families themselves as members of that 
society have most probably also imbibed this value. In other words,
they will most probably be biased in their response to a woman's 
appeal for protection because they are already biased in their 
perception of violence against wives.
Social dispute settlement also falls because it lacks' 
authoritative intervention powers in inter-spoUsal violence. When a 
father's word to his son or a mother's wish to her son were still 
"law," familial intervention could perhaps have been "effective" 
protection for an assaulted wife. Nowadays, however, in most cases a 
father’s word or a mother's wish no longer carry the same weight. 
Consequently, the efficacy of their interventionist powers in 
protecting a wife has been correspondingly reduced. Therefore, the 
social dispute settlement process can no longer be relied on to 
protect victims of violence against wives.
REFUGE
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Under customary law, a husband had no obligation to maintain his 
absconding spouse, and the position of women was and in the generality 
of cases still is, of partial or total economic dependence upon one 
man or another:
"The position of the native woman must be regarded. She, under 
native law and custom, if not associated with or attached to 
some man, is lost. It is difficult for her to find even a 
habitation or home. She cannot acquire property for the future 
of any son, especially in regard to his marriage, and may be 
driven to follow the oldest profession in the world. She could 
only with the greatest difficulty find the means of suitably 
sustaining and bringing up her children." ^
Therefore, in real terms divorcing one' s husband meant
13 Chlduku v. Chldano, 1922 SR 56, 88
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dependence upon one's father or his representative. Consequently, the 
father's or his representative's attitudes towards assuming this 
responsibility were of paramount importance to a woman's decision. 
But the disadvantages upon a father who intervened in a husband-wife 
assault case to protect his daughter were such as to militate against 
a father deciding to so intervene in the first place. It was 
contrary to customary law for a father to Interfere in a fight between 
his daughter and her husband. His Intervention had to be actually 
solicited or justified in view of the gravity of the fight and/or the 
special circumstances surrounding the case. Failure to observe this 
rule of social etiquette could jeopardise some of the father's rights 
in relation to the lobola paid for his daughter. It is trite that 
lobola served, inter alia, as a guarantee of the good behaviour not 
only of the spouses/cohabitees, but of their respective families as 
well. The parties' behaviour was thus translated into, and reflected 
in their rights.vis a vis lobola: those who were to blame lost some
of .their lobola rights to the other parties. A father's intervention 
on behalf of his daughter might have been perceived as condonation of 
the conduct to which her husband and/or in-laws were objecting. Such 
a situation, would prejudice the father's bargaining position vis a vis 
lobola. On divorce if lobola had already been paid for his daughter 
he would only retain a small portion of it and,, if it had not yet been 
paid, he would be unable to claim some of it, the amount forfeited 
depending on the blameworthiness of the wrong-doing party. ^
In addition, if during the subsistence of his daughter's 
marriage a father who still held lobola for his daughter maintained 
his daughter and her children he could not claim a reimbursement from 
his son-in-law. The only exceptions to this rule were those cases in 
which the father undertook this obligation pursuant to an agreement 
between him and the son-in-law as well as those oneB in which none of 
the son-in-law's relatives were willing to take on this responsibility 
and the father-in-law perforce had to undertake it. 15 in cases
where the father-in-law maintained his daughter and her children 
because he was shielding her from being assaulted by her husband it 
most probably would have been difficult to prove such an agreement, 
and most likely the- daughter herself would not have gone to her 
father because her in-laws are not willing to take her in but because 
she sees their protection and intervention as being ineffectual 
against her husband's violent behaviour. Therefore, on the basis of 
the applicable customary law rule such a father was unlikely to be 
reimbursed. Quite clearly, therefore, this consideration militated 
against a father's coming to his daughter's rescue, at least as long 
as the marriage subsisted. Thus in Magomo Mutuwa v Henry Mupfekl 
the woman's father told his son-in-law, "I do not want to keep your 
wife and children for nothing."
Things have changed somewhat now. A husband is now the person 
primarily responsible for the maintenance of his wife and children 
whether or not they are staying With him. ^  This duty is not 1456
14. See M. Maboreke, M.Phll Thesis, Chapter 5.
15. See, for instance, Sltayi v Lomacala and Mhlala, 1928-62 SRN 28; 
Mado v Skudamedzi, 1928-62 SRN 193, Ginza v Ishannes 1928-62 SRN 
755.
16. Case No. 115 Blndura District Court, 10 December 1981.
. Section 12(3) and 4 of The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act
6/81.
17
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conditional upon' any- consideration. . It follows, therefore), that 
whatever the circumstanced anyone who has to discharge this duty-on 
behalf of the husband should be entitled to a reimbursement. from him. 
This, however, does not affect the parties' positions in relation to 
lobola IB and this consideration might continue to .influence fathers 
away from offering their daughters refuge.
DIVORCE
In the event of. the failure of. the. social dispute settlement process 
discussed above there was. still the remedy of divorce to. . fall back 
upon. The point has already .- been made that the general position of 
women was that of socio-economic-dependence upon their menfolk. . Under 
customary law,, however, a man was not obliged to. maintain his. former 
• wife/cohabitee or-children ' whose- physical custody : did . not vest in 
him. .: In - real ter Sib,. therefore, divorcing one's husband meant
dependence upon one's father Or his. representative,, a prospect that
both . fathers and daughters may not have.found easily palatable. Now, 
however,-the Customary Law and Primary; Courts Act No.6/61 provides 
that . a man must maintain his former Wife, or cohabitee, until her death 
or re-marriage.whichever is the sooner. Consequently, even Where, the 
husband or. male cohabitee. IS. the ..woman's sole source of. livelihood 
divorcing or leaving him. is. no . longer necessarily tantamount to
cutting one's lifeline as wasthe case prior to the. enactment of. thiB 
Act.. ..It is important, however, to. note that the efficacy of
maintenance provisions In meeting the needs of assaulted women will 
perhaps ultimately depend . upon the conscientiousness of those charged 
with their administration as. well as-those people whose homes must. act 
as refuges/bases and who.usually also have to meet the woman's initial 
expenses. As a very minimum requirement, therefore, . . the
administration of maintenance claims, and . payments should.be simple, 
efficacious and time-efficient* -
B. GENERAL LAW
UNDER STATUTB
For the maintenance of peace the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
1983 provides, for the issuihg .of peace "binding, over orders" or 
interdicts and the entering of recognisances 20 against violent
people, and this Includes husbands Who assault their wives. It also 
makes provision fot the recovery of compensatory damages for any 
property, and/or injury suffered by the victim, provided however, that 
the victim specifically asks for them and the amount claimed does not 
exceed Z$1000.00. 21 There appears to be no reasonable reason for
limiting the recoverable compensation and requiring the victim to
specifically ask for compensation or or limiting this to damage caused 
to property either, since the compensation;claimed has been occasioned 
by the accused. There is, therefore, perhaps no need for maintaining 
the current z|l,000-00 celling on compensation recoverable in terms of 
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. It is therefore proposed *189
________________________________ \ ________________
18. Because although maintenance liability for wife and children may 
affect the quantum of lobola to be paid over to, or retained by, 
the father-in-law, maintenance and lobola are nonetheless 
different institutions.
19. Section 361. '
. Sections 120 and 334.20
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that compensation be automatic and'that the current celling be lifted, 
and that the categories of compensation recoverable be extended to 
cover damage to the person.
UNDER THE COMMON LAW
INTERDICTS
Under common law a husband who assaults his wife can be Interdicted 
from bo doing. However, this remedy Is available only If the 
application for It Is attached to a more substantial claim and there 
Is a close - nexus between the Interdict claimed and that more 
substantial claim.' In addition, , the court also considers the 
applicant's chances of,, success In that more substantial claim. 21 2 
These provisions detract from the interdict's usefulness to assaulted 
wives. These wives may, for instance not want divorce or judicial 
separation but rather only want time In which to think things through 
and then make their decision. Further, the fact that a wife may not 
be successful In the more substantial claim to. which the application 
for an. Interdict Is attached does not detract from her need.for 
- protection against her.'violent husband. . Therefore interdicts should 
perhaps be available without having to be attached to more substantial 
claims. This would also remove the question.whether or.not there Is a 
close nexus between the Interdict sought and the. claim to which it is 
attached as well as the chances of success of that more substantial 
claim. Perhaps, too, Interdicts relating to Violence against, wives 
should also be available on. an interim as well as ex^  parte basis 
whenever this is reasonably necessary for the protection of women who 
have been, or stand the risk of being, assaulted. It is, however, 
conceded that the requirement as to.reasonableness might be used as an 
avenue for . the (re)-lntrbductlbn/contlnued. operation of negative 
attitudes, so counteracting the Intended beneficial aspects of the 
proposed changes.
DELICTUAL COMPENSATION
The position used to be that whether the marriage was in or out of 
community of property, in the absence of a. divorce or a judicial 
separation the.husband was immune to delictual damages, actions, for 
assault at the suit of his wife. 23 24 The justification for this 
principle was, in the court's words in Mann v Mann, 2  ^ as follows:
"Under Roman-Dutch law marriages are ■ in community of property. 
Under .: such a marriage the husband is vested with control of the 
joint estate. It would be useless for the wife to sue him for 
money which he would receive and administer. Consequently, I do 
not see.how there can be: civil actions between them involving 
the payment of money by the one spouse to the other. If. the 
wife sues her husband,.the latter is entitled to the amount of 
- the judgment paid over to her . As long as the.marriage 
subsists and there is no legal "separation", it would be no 
advantage to the wife to get a judgment against her husband for
21. Section 341.
22. Christopher Terry McCabe v Alison Mary McCabe HC-H-109-86.
23. Mann v Mann 1918 CPD 89 (SA).
24. supra
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he still would be entitled to the administration of the 
proceeds."
Such an argument does not explain why the law denied a woman 
■tarried out of community of property and who, therefore, has the 
administration of her individual estate, an action against her husband 
for delictual damages for assault. In the Mann case, supra, the court 
sought to justify the extension of this legal principle (i.e denying 
wives married in community of property the right to sue their husbands 
delictually for assault while they continue their married life 
together) to wives married out of community of property by arguing that
"It would . be an anomaly to allow a wife married out of community 
of property to sue her husband for a tort and refuse that remedy 
to a wife married in community of property."
The reason why it would be an anomaly was not given. It is 
submitted .that the court's argument is without merit or substance 
since allowing a wife married out of community of property such an 
action accords with legal principle and is even supportable on the 
court's own argument in relation to a wife married in community of 
property. It is here submitted that the real reason for disallowing 
wives such an actio.n was really the. protection of the husband's 
Interests, vide
VoetJ47.10.2. "a wife cruelly beaten.by her husband ought not to 
proceed by way of the actio injuriorum in order that the fama of 
the husband may still remain."
According to Mann v Mann, supra
"One difference between the actio injuriorum in Roman Law and 
the actio infactum (in the case) consisted in the fact that the 
consequence of a defendant being condemned in the former action 
was that he suffered "infana" involving the loss of certain 
important civil rights.....whereas the actio in factum did not 
entail these consequences."
Ulrich Huber 2.3.10.21: "the actio inurlarum does not obtain 
between spouses because he who is condemned in such an action 
loses all reputation or at any event has reputation lowered."
Brouwer 25 goes even further to state that neither the actio 
injuriorum nor the actio lnfactum is open to an assaulted wife, 
meaning that such a wife is in fact remediless!
It has now been settled, however, that a wife can recover 
delictually for loss sustained as a result of the assault as well as 
for pain and suffering. 26 ^ question which arises is whether, with 
the current socio-economic reality of most women in Zimbabwe, such a 
move would benefit assaulted women to any significant degree. Between 
spouses the duty of support is mutual. Both spouses are also obliged 
to support their offspring. The reality, however, appears to be that 
in the majority of cases this duty devolves upon the husband; in 
others it devolves upon the husband and wife having regard to their *26
25 See Mann v Mann, 1918 CPD 89 (SA).
26. Rohloff v Oceans Accident and Guarantee Corportatlon Ltd 1960(2) 
SA 291(AD).
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respective incomes and yet in others it falls upon the wife. An 
examination of literature on women's socio-economic placement in 
Zimbabwe, 26 indicates that the iast category is most likely to be 
made up of very few women-, followed by the second category. It is 
quite feasible that after paying compensatory damages to the wife the 
husband might then refuse to contribute towards the upkeep of the 
family thereby forcing the wife to draw upon the judgment money for 
this purpose and thereby in effect negating the rationale behind the 
delictual damages action. The court could perhaps make an order 
expressly forbidding this kind of behaviour but' such order would 
probably be so difficult to police that perhaps it should not be made 
at all. All these shortcomings notwithstanding, it is submitted that 
as a matter of principle the law should make provision for the 
recovery of delictual damages by an assaulted spouse whether or not 
their marriage still subsists and whether or not they still keep a 
joint household. This would not only help those women whose husbands 
do not hold back upkeep money in order to force the woman to spend the 
money given to her pursuant to the judgment oh household necessities 
but would also serve to register legal disapproval of violence against 
wives.
DIVORCE AS A SOLUTION
Under general law another remedy open to a wife Who had been assaulted 
by her husband is an action for divorce on the basis of the husband's 
cruelty. Until 7 February 1986 when the new Matrimonial Causes Act NO 
33/85 came into operation a divorce could be granted on, inter alia, 
the ground that a defendant spouse had "during the subsistence of the 
marriage treated the plaintiff with such cruelty as makes the 
continuance of married life insupportable”.
Such a formulation does not encompass all forms of cruelty, thus 
Impliedly permitting some forms of cruelty. Thus, for instance, it 
has been held that the test as to whether to grant a divorce on the 
basis of cruelty is as follows:
"a charge of cruelty is a serious charge and a spouse is not 
lightly to . be held guilty of it, and the conduct complained, of 
should not come within the kind which has been described as the 
ordinary wear and tear of married life! (What should be 
considered) is whether the plaintiff has proved that during the 
subsistence of the marriage the defendant has treated her with 
such cruelty as to make the continue of married life in 
supportable. In doing so it is necessary to consider what the 
impact of the conduct complained of was on the complaining 
party... In a cruelty case the question is whether this conduct 
to this woman, or vice versa, is cruelty.” 27
; Quite clearly, therefore, these legal provisions lacked a 
categorical statement that violence against wives of any kind is 
illegal and sanctionable by divorce for, from the above formulation 267
26. See e.g. M. Maboreke, op clt; The National Manpower Survey 
1981; The Zimbabwe Report on The United Nations Decade for 
women; Report on the Situation of Women in Zimbabwe (UNICEF); 
"We carry A Heavy Load: Rural Women in Zimbabwe Speak Out", 
(UNICEF); 0. • Muchena, Zimbabwe Women: A Socio - Economic 
Overview.
27. Ryan v Ry.an 1963 R & N 356 (SR)
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not every violent act 1b Been as making the continuance of married 
life insupportable«
The now repealed Matrimonial Causes Act also provided that a 
spouse could not bring a cruelty charge against her/his spouBe and get 
a divorce thereon if he/she were somehow to blame for that cruelty. 
Disputes between husbands and wives can rarely be seen in terms of 
black and white but, rather,grey. Therefore, realistically 6peaking, 
unless the wife were a saint, there is ho way In which she could not 
in some way be perceived a6 being to blame for the assault. It is 
conceded that the provision required that the plalhtlff spouse should 
have been "appreciably" to blame. Nonetheless the provision and its 
interpretation Indicates a victim-blaming theory which - seeks 
justification for the husband's Cruel conduct on' the wife's prior 
wrongful acts. The point is that the husband has no right whatever to 
assault his wife, and ho amount of wrongdoing on the wife's part can 
bleach the husband’s actions of their criminality although this has 
tended to be seen as reducing his moral blameworthiness. Therefore, 
for the law to hold as it did and still, does that a wife cannot get a 
-fivorce Unless the cruelty that she complains of ha6 reached a certain 
stage and has brought about certain consequences is to negate the 
wife's right to be protected from all kinds of assault and amounts, in 
effect, to a legitimation of some degree of violence within the 
marriage institution.'
The purely legalistic changes introduced by the new Matrimonial 
Causes Act 33/85 do not herald much for victims of violence against 
wives. 28 The new provisions require, as a condition precedent to 
the granting of a divorce on whatever ground, that the conduct 
complained of must be such as is "incompatible with the continuation 
of a normal marriage relationship." Apart from a slight difference in 
the wording and substantial construction which really is of no 
consequence for present purposes, this requirement is the same as that 
contained in the now repealed old Matrimonial Causes Act So that what 
was said above in relation to that old provision applies .mutatls 
mutandis; to this new provision. In any case, a "normal" marriage 
relationship as it has been apparently understood within the 
Zimbabwean courts almost inevitably entails some form of violence upon 
the one spouse by the other. Further, notions on what is reasonable 
to expect a spouse to bear are highly volatile, depending, as they do, 
on a particular judge’s assessment of social values, again an issue on 
which there rarely is ever any consensus. Because of this fluidity 
and indeterminacy of the issues to be adjudicated upon, with a few 
exceptions and within the limits set by the doctrine of precedent, the 
outcome of particular cases will most likely hinge upon the individual 
judge’s inarticulate premises. In addition, the new changes might, 
from the assaulted wife's point of view, Actually be a move for the 
worse, at least in those cases brought before the High Court and in 
which, therefore, divorce can be granted only on proof of 
"irretrievable breakdown of the marriage". Where a wife objects to 
the violence and not to the marriage itself and would stay within the 
marriage if the husband were to shed his violent behaviour, it might 
be difficult for a wife to prove to the court's satisfaction that 
their marriage has irretrievably broken down. Since the wife is 
prepared to continue with the marriage if the Violence stops, the
28. ■ Samuel Chlmbadzwa v Joyce Chimbadzwa HC^-H-ASl-BB.
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marriage has not irretrievably broken down.
4. POLICE RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES
The police have come under fire from women who have sought their 
protection when being, or after having been, assaulted. It is 
reported that at most the police have Just warned the 
ex-husbands/boyfriends not to do it again and/or advised the women or 
what action to take. Usually, however, it is reported that,the police 
have been passive and bystandets and thus, for instance, in Venencis 
Manana v Andrew Manana 29 the wife testified that when, during the 
course of being assaulted, she called for help the police were Callec 
but "nothing was done as they treated this as a domestic matter.b Tw( 
basic methods are available to the police dealing with cases ol 
violence against wives, viz, the formal and the informal methods. 
Informal methods range from persuasion down to threats of arrests. 
Formal methods involve the arrest of one or both parties and may 
indeed be very necessary in cases of serious assault or when the 
victim wants to lodge a formal complaint. Generally, however, an 
arrest is perhaps not the most desirable resolution of the conflict. 
In most cases the party arrested cah gain almost immediate release by 
paying bail or simply promising to appear on the due date to answer to 
the charges. This quite often results in the husband returning home 
or to the scene of the conflict with a different and more potent 
reason for renewing the conflict. Informal methods, too, are not 
necessarily the best but they do appear better and more expedient than 
the formal ones though their efficacy may perhaps Ultimately depend 
upon the individual man's respect for the Word of a police officer. 
Both alternatives, however, do not allow for dealing with the causes 
of the problem. Consequently the police Usually find themselves 
repeatedly confronted by a problem which, with the powers currently 
available to them, they cannot reBolve. Given these limitations upon 
their interventionist powers in cases of violence against wives it is 
perhaps not difficult to understand why the police may fail or be 
reluctant to respond to wives' distress calls. Despite all this, 
however, the police remain probably the most appropriate agency to 
handle such cases because not only are they geared for emergency 
action on a twenty-four hour basis, but they also possess the 
authoritative intervention capability that such cases usually 
require. The police also have a very special role to play because not 
only are they the immediate representatives of a remote government 
control but they are also very often the first . to be called to the 
scene of the violence as well as to whom the violence is reported and, 
as a result of this immediate or almost immediate participation, they 
are also uniquely placed to act as a referral agency to other 
available services. Perhaps, therefore, what the police need is the 
training and powers necessary to enable them to adequately handle SUch 
cases.
5 WOMEN'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC POSITION AMP THE ADEQUACY OF THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM
As said before, under Zimbabwean law assaulting one's Wife is a crime 
punishable by a fine, imprisonment or both. However these sanctions 
have, for a variety of reasons, not always proved appropriate or 
adequate.
29 Juvenile Court 68/85.
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In Tembo Samson v the Queen 30 the husband had assaulted his 
wife so severely that she sustained Severe injuries, bled profusely 
and lost consciousness. In assessing sentence Beadle C.J held as 
follows:
"The appellant is employed in the Army and has been for seven 
years. He has a good record. He has no previous convictions 
and if he is sent to prison the evidence is he will lose his 
employment in the circumstances. Hi6 offence is a very serious 
one, but in view of his good record and in view of the fact that
his employment is at stake, 1 do not consider that he should be
sent to prison without the optioh of a fine and I hope in the 
circumstances the Army will see fit to re-employ the appellant “
This was also the approach adopted by the Court in Japhet Ngwaru 
v The State 31 where the Court held that:
"in normal circumstances and if these special circumstances were 
not present, I would regard an effective prison sentence as a 
proper punishment for an assault of this severely. However, the 
circumstances are there and for a prison officer with 6 years 
service who will lose considerable benefits and his Job if an 
effective sentence of imprisonment^ were imposed it seems to me
that this is a case in which the imposition of a fine with
imprisonment in default of payment would be proper.'
Unless necessary in the Wife's own interests there appears to be 
no reasonable reason why a violent husband should be shielded from his 
voluntary, deliberate and intended actionsi holding otherwise negates 
the whole purpose behind criminalising violence against wives in the 
first place. In the two cases given above the protectionist attitude 
adopted by the court towards the accused husbands despite their being 
the wrongdoers could, in financial terms, be viewed as protectionism 
towards the wives as well, least-Ways where the husbands are an 
Indispensable source of income to wives! because if a fine is Imposed 
the money paid goes to swell the State coffers while the woman and the 
children go without, and if a prison sentence be imposed still the 
woman and the children suffer because of the redundancy forced on the 
family breadwinner. In fact in The State v Canneth Pedzlsayl 32 the 
court is quite explicit about this for it Set aside both the 
conviction and the sentence “because the complainant Wife will suffer 
from it. " In fact the general importance of the role played by 
women's socio-economic dependence on men in entrapping women within 
violent marriages is testified by the ■ fact that in almost every 
article dealing with violence against Wives there is some allusion to 
this aspect of the problem. 33 Thus for instance, Emily Jane Goodman 
writes that
“Economic dependence is perhaps the single most common reason
30. Jdmt. Ho A.D. 152/76.
31. Jdmt. No. A.D. 172/00.
32. HC-H-207-83.
33. See D. Martin, (1976) (ed) Battered Wives of America, San 
Franslsco, Guide.
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why abused wives choose to stay within a violent marriage",34 
and Prescott states that:
"for women with children, . with low education, and without 
marketable skills, there are feW alternatives to ending the 
violence In their marriages". ^5
Clearly, therefore, the enhancement of women's socio-economic 
situation is a prerequisite for the success of solutions directed 
towards finding viable alternatives ' for women who find themselves 
locked within violent marrlages/relationshlps. Not imposing either a 
fine or prison sentence, however, probably generates in the accused 
the feeling that the law condones his actions and that as he got away 
with it this time he might well get away with it again next time - 
meaning in effect, that the law loses its deterrent aspect. On the 
part of victim wives such an approach might Well engender the feeling 
that the law connives with assailant husbands so that the wives might 
stop bothering about the law because the law does not bother about 
them. This argument questions the appropriateness and adequacy of 
the criminal justice system as a .Solution to violence against wives. 
For instance in Raymond Alan Mace v The State 36 the court was moved 
to remark that:
"It is in the highest degree improbable that a normal woman 
would inflict injuries of this nature on herself. It is, 
however, almost equally improbable that a normal man would 
inflict such injuries on his wife. It is, therefore, of the 
greatest importance at the outset to Consider to what extent one 
is dealing with normal people in this case. The only evidence 
lending credibility to' either allegation, that of the 
complainant or that of the appellant, is the clear evidence' that 
such injuries were in fact inflicted on the complainant."
The aim of the law should be to' provide protection for the 
assaulted wife whenever she asks for it. In addition, the law should 
seek, wherever possible, to be preventative and only turn retributive 
when its preventive aspect fails'. However', there is not much 
.latitude to the traditional criminal justice system. While violence 
against wives is usually symptomatic of deep-rooted inter-spousal 
conflict, the function of the judge presiding over a criminal case is 
to adjudicate on criminal innocence and/or - guilt and to punish if 
necessary.' Hence, although a judge may ’very well have some very 
good, humane solutions to some of the. problems, as a judge of the 
criminal bench he/she is prohibited from using them because generally 
he/she is not allowed the luxury of exploring the underlying causes of 
a crime. The causal aspects of inter-spousal violence are diverse 
and the strategies to counter it must, therefore, be as diverse. 
Unfortunately, however, the criminal justice as presently constituted 
and structured is not as diverse. It is -punitive and retributive 
rather than preventative and therapeutic; it tends to treat the 
result and rarely, if ever, the causal factors. Further, criminal 
law mandates that only the incident at hand be dealt with and that 
indirect circumstances and causes are largely irrelevant. In addition,
34. Maria Roy (ed) (1977),"Legal Solutions : Equal Protection under 
the Law," in Battered Women: A Psychological Study of Domestic 
Violence. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co, p. 139, at 146.
35. Martin, op clt, at p. 84.
36. Jdmt No AD 46/72.
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the constraints Imposed by the rules of evidence and the requirements 
of due process of law may require dismissal of the specific charge, 
but the court's dismissal of that charge does not dlsmlss/solve the 
problem but only shelves It for a later and probably more potent 
eruption. Even a conviction does not bar a recurrence of the problem 
unless the conflict-generating factors are In some way dealt with. 
Consequently, the probability that the dispute will flare up again 
after the close of the criminal prosecution is. almost assured. The 
overall aim should be to remove the violence from a marriage and 
restore marital harmony if that is what the victim wants and it_ is 
practicable. The point, therefore, needs to be considered whether, 
in view of the violence actually perpetrated or threatened, 
prosecuting the husband for the offence will achieve the desired 
marital harmony, by improving the relationship, enhancing the mutual 
respect which husband and wife should have for each other, increasing 
the husband's ability to understand and control his aggression or to 
satisfy the wife's need for protection as expressed by her appeal to 
the court for help. The failure of the crimihal justice , system ■ to 
provide for the fact that the parties involved have an on-going 
relationship of mutual dependence, as well as the fact that whatever 
punishment the court Imposes upon the husband will have some Impact 
upon the whole family also testify to the Inappropriateness of the 
criminal justice system as a long term solution to violence against 
wives in the generality of cases. In those cases in which the husband 
is beyond therapeutic measures the criminal justice System may still 
be appropriate and In such cases the law must be the best possible. 
In other cases, however, perhaps the solution for violence against 
wives Is best sought elsewhere. More precisely, the point being made 
here is that legalistic measures need to be under-pinned by supportive 
social measures because apparently the law only, works when It Is in 
line with other social, economic and political factors.
The necessary converse side of the coin requiring the admission 
of politico-socio-economic considerations into the decision of a legal 
case is that judges should be granted sufficient powers to enable them 
to take judicial cognisance of these aspects. This Is necessary not 
so much to exonerate the husband or.lessen his moral blameworthiness 
and the criminality of his actions, as to enable the judge to make a 
decision which takes Into account the real life situation of the 
spouses. Such a decision would probably earn the respect of both 
spouses as well as have longer lasting curative effects.
Generally speaking, for laws to have optimum effect they must be 
sympathetically Interpreted by those' who administer them. 
Consequently, what is called for 1b not just the Involved personnel's 
legal training or a dogmatic legalistic approach which only sees the 
legality or illegality of actions but rather their humane qualities of 
being able to listen to, understand and show concern for human 
problems. The attitude that a certain level of wife beating Is 
legitimate, or that It Is legitimate among certain groups or sections 
of society, or that the wife "asked for it" must be weeded out of the 
mediation or decision-making processes. Above all, judges must be 
made not only to regard and deal with It with the disfavour It 
deserves but also as being morally wrong and socially unacceptable.
6. SOME NOTICEABLE TRENDS
Many cases Involving violence against wives have passed through our 
courts both prior to and after Independence. It is not possible, nor 
indeed desirable to examine all of them in an article of this nature
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and size. Consequently only a few illustrative cases are examined 
under this section and even then only whett necessary to bolster a 
point or observation being made.
A. GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OP VIOLENCE AGAINST HIVES AS A SOCIAL NORM
An examination of BOtne of the Zimbabwean case law on violence: against 
wives indicates an apparent reluctance to view Violence against wives 
as . being sufficiently criminal to warrant legal reprobation. This 
attitude is apparent in both the courts and the victim 
wives/cohabitees themselves; On the part of the Victims this is shown 
by the fact that approaching the court for relief in the form of a 
divorce action is usually a woman's last resort and that even when she 
eventually does so it is rarely on the gtbundS of physical cruelty. 
37 Thus, for instance, ih Zandile Ndlovu V Never Ndlovu 38 although 
the evidence adduced showed that the wife was really basing her action 
on the physical and mental cruelty of her husband, she framed her 
action as being one on "the grounds of bareness.” And in Franslsca 
A/B Simon v Matope 39 a wife who had previously asked for a divorce 
on the basis of physical cruelty and had been told to go back and 
attempt a reconciliation, came back a year later claiming a divorce, 
this time on the baSis of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage 
and she got it, thus indicating a general acceptance of violence 
against wives as a social horm by the judiciary; A possible 
explanation for the Wives' behaviour in seeking a divorce on' grounds 
other than physical cruelty even where this would be the actual ground 
could be that they too ate aware of this attitude oti the patt of the 
judiciary, perhaps as a result of seeing what is going on in the 
courts. Generally a wife seeks a divorce only after she . has . resigned 
herself to its inevitability. Therefore for the court to require the 
wife, as it did in this case, to attempt a reconciliation after she
has approached it for a reprieve is to perhaps unnecessarily consign 
her to further violence by her husband who will still be shielded, by 
the protective sheath of his being her lawfully wedded husband.
Consequently it is submitted that once a woman has proven the 
physical cruelty on which she bases her divorce action she should not, 
without her free and informed consent, be required to attempt a 
reconciliation.
In relation to criminal actions it is difficult to state
categorically what the situation is because there is no way, without 
having had access to the full records of the individual cases 
analysed, in which one can tell whether the prosecution of an 
assailant husband was at the instance of the wife or that of the 
-state. There is, howeverj perhaps no reason to assume that women
would be more willing to resort to the criminal remedy when they have
not shown any enthusiasm for the civil remedy of divorce, especially 
when the criminal law remedy concerned would leave them under the 
power of the person against whom they would have testified in court.
On the part of the police this apparent acceptance of violence 
against wives as a social norm is illustrated by their lukewarm
Z; L. Rev. Vol. 4 1986
37. See Chapter 6 of M.Maboreke's M.Phil; Thesis.
38. Harare Community CoUrt 284/85.
39 1953 SRN 250
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response to victims' appeals for assistance. On the part of the
judiciary this same phenomenon is shown by several factors. Firstly 
it is shown by an apparent reluctance to hold the husband's right to 
physically chastise his wife obsolete. A case in point is Mucheno v 
Chlsamba and Chisamba ^  in which the husband had habitually 
assaulted his wife and had in fact been convicted several times for so 
doing. The husband actually agreed that he had "thoroughly asserted 
what he alleges to be his rights under Native law to chastise his wife 
severely." The court refused to hold categorically that a husband no 
longer has such a right. Instead, it held that it could
"not justify the extension of the husband's marital power under 
customary law to include nowadays an indisputable right to 
thrash his wife over a period of years... in particular, as 
both husband and wife do, or at any rate, did, profess 
Christianity, I felt it my duty to interpret the provisions of 
Native law strictly in conformity with civilized concepts. I 
accordingly refused to recognize that he had any right 
whatsoever to stab, or even thrash, his wife."
This case is by no means a blanket absolution of the husband's 
right to chastise his wife. At least two assumptions are inherent in 
the court's decision. The first one is that a husband who 
"moderately" chastises his wife, or "thrashes” her over only a short 
period of time, is only exercising his rights and that, therefore, the 
wife cannot create a matrimonial offence out of her husband's legally 
created and protected right. The second assumption is that a wife who 
is party to a "civilized" mattiage is entitled to more protection than 
her barbarian counterpart who is party to an "uncivilized"
marriage/union. It is generally agreed that these so-called
"uncivilized” marriages/unions by far outnumber the."civilized" ones. 
Therefore, not many women could have benefitted from the Mucheno 
supra, qualification to the husband's right to chastise his wife; S v 
Mdindela, ^2 an orange Provincial Division case, also typifies the 
prevalent judicial reluctance to hold, the husband's right to chastise 
his wife extinct. Said Steyn, J. in that case:
"Quite obviously the accused was convinced that his wife had 
misconducted herself sexually during her absence and was deeply 
■affronted at her. Man, in the sense, of the male of the species, 
no longer possesses his wife as part of his chattels, but still 
prides himself on being the sole possessor of her affections and 
the sole recipient of her favours. It can truthfully be said 
that next to life itself the affectionate and unfailing fidelity 
of his wife is man's most precious personal possession. A 
deprivation thereof, or a firm, albeit erroneous, conviction of 
such deprivation, usually causes deep distress and often also 
the great wrath of hurt pride. The accused clearly fell victim 
to. both those emotions and sought to ease his travail by'doing 
violence to complainant's body. This violence was also intended 
to make her mend her ways, but that cannot excuse his actions, 
because a husband no longer has the right to administer even
40. Nyaral Bonde v John Makwavarara JC84/85, Florence Mushambi v 
Ishmael Mushambl. Harare Community Court, 30/85.
41. 1940 SR 157.
42. 1977 (3) SA 323.
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moderate corporal correction to an erring wife. Vet, under certain 
circumstances, the reason for such correction can certainly temper the 
moral blameworthiness of the offended husband's conduct even though 
the correction is often unavailing".
B. SEEKING JUSTIFICATION FOR ASSAULTS
A reading of most of the cases cited above shows other phenomena 
typical of. judges adjudicating upon cases involving violence against 
wives. There is an almost deliberate endeavour to find justification 
for the assault and emphasis Upon factors that operate in the man's 
favour and down playing those that have a tendency to exacerbate his 
guilt. 43 jn this way the courts have concerned themselves not so 
much with the (ex-) ' husband's/boyfrlend's infringement of the
wife's/woman's right to be protected from assault as with the reasons 
for the assaults. Thus, for Instance, in Munemo v Mandlyera and
Sengeza 4,4 the court confined itself to the questions whether or not
the husband had "any valid excuse" for assaulting his wife and, if so, 
whether he had not overstepped the bounds of lawful correction. 
Another typical case In this respect is R v M. F. Clarke 45 m  which 
a husband who had been bound over to keep the peace in relation to his 
wife had, in breach of this binding order, severely assaulted her just 
eight days after the issuing of this order. The court emphasized all
the factors in the husband's favour in' order to justify its
substitution of a six months' imprisonment sentence with a wholly 
suspended three months' jail sentence, and this notwithstanding the 
husband's violent disposition as testified not just by the existence 
of the peace bond against him but also by the by the fact due to his 
violent disposition the parties' married life together had lasted a 
mere ten days. In this case, as in Esther Kangal A/B Pedzal v 
Malros Kangal 461 the husband's previous convictions for assaulting 
his wife themselves a very rare phenomenon were not taken into account 
in either coming to the decision or computing the sentence.
C. VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES - A CRIME IN A CLASS OP ITS OWN
At present violence against wives is just as criminal as any other 
crime which constitutes bodily assault. However, the sanctity of 
marriage and the adage that a man's home is his castle which 
apparently pervade the whole fabric of Zimbabwean society, at least in 
so far as most aspects of his relationship with his wife are 
concerned, are reflected in the legal system. Two cases are 
particularly reflective of this issue. In The State v Mlsheck
Mandizvldza, 47 a case involving assault by a son upon his aged 
mother, Blackle, J. noted that;
43. ‘ See, for instance Munemo v Mandlyera and Sengeza 1943 SRN 261; R
v M F Clarke 1969 (4) SA 91 (RAD).
44. 1943 SRN 262.
45. 1969 (4) SA 91 (R,A-D); see also s. 5, op clt.
46. Harare Comnunity Court 240/85.
47 HC-H-353-86.
I"The Attorney-General has referred to a number of cases where, 
notwithstanding some factual difference, more serious injury' and 
permanent disability were caused to the complainants and yet the 
accuseds were sentenced to periods of imprisonment significantly 
less than that imposed on the accused in this case".
Examination of those cases referred to by the Attorney-General 
shows that all those cases involved husband/wife or 
boyfriend/girlfriend cases. ■ A reading of The State V Mlsheck 
Mandlzvidza, supra shows that both the magistrates1 court and the High. 
Court placed violence against Wives on a rung lower, than other kinds 
of intra-family violence. On the part of the magistrates' court this■ 
is shown.by its imposition of,a heavy.sentence which was "not in line , 
with decided cases", a practice rarely, if. ever, adopted in relation 
to violence against wives. On the part of the High Court this is 
shown by its statement that "the accused Was his 63 year old mother, 
and the accused's actions cannot be excused,"a sentence expressing a 
moral sentiment conspicuously lacking in cases involving violence 
against wives. This shows that perhaps it is not the fact that the 
parties are related to each other which results in violence against 
wives being trivialized by the Judiciary but rather the existence of a 
husband/wife or boyfriend/girlfriend relationship which costs. the, 
female parties thereto legal protection against physical assault. In 
fact, in the second of the two cases referred to above, ^8 The State 
v John Mushava ^  involving a husband who had assaulted his wife, it 
was actually held by the High Court,, per Reynolds, J., that the 
"domestic? nature of Violence against Wives lessens the husband’s 
guilt:
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"It seems to me that this Was nothing more than a domestic 
dispute"..»"While, conceding that it could not be said, that the 
sentence the appellant received induced a sense of shock, 
[Counsel] for the appellant contended that this court, is 
entitled to interfere with the sentence because, as he put it, 
the magistrate misdirected himself in assessing sentence as he. 
did not take into consideration the fact that the assault on the 
complainant resulted from a domestic dispute. With respect I 
{ think there is no merit in this contention. The magistrate did 
bear in mind, in assessing sentence, that the dispute which 
occurred, between the complainant and the appellant was a 
domestic one."
In other words, . had the assault involved not been a domestic 
one, the sentence imposed by the magistrate would have been 
appropriate but because the assault was domestic, the sentence had to 
be proportionately reduced. In this way the court not only tacitly 
interpreted the marriage licence as a hitting licence but also 
extended this interpretation to cover boyfriend/girlfriend situations 
for the facts of this cAse were that the man had severely assaulted 
his girlfriend because she had refused to allow him to. spend the night 
with her on the basis that he had stopped supporting her financially.
48. The ’ first one, is The State v Mlsheck Mandlzvidza, op cit, 
discusses immediately above. >
49 HC-H-366-86
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UNREGISTERED CUSTOMARY LAW UNIONS
Although the judiciary haS otherwise given full effect to s. 3(3) of 
the African Marriages Act ^0 which provides, inter alia, that 
unregistered customary law Unions are not marriages at all except for 
the purposes of legitimacy, custody, guardianship as well as rights of 
succession of the children, in practice the courts have added an 
exception of their own, viz, for the purposes of exculpating and/or 
lessening the man's assault Upon the woman of its wrongfulness 
A relationship which is not deemed sufficient to give a woman a wife's 
legal 'rights Is thus nonetheless deemed adequate for the purposes of 
the depriving her of the rights of a Hon-wife. 52 This places the 
woman in a no-win position.
THE FACT OF A (PREVIOUS) RELATIONSHIP
The courts have not just said the existence of a marriage or 
unregistered customary law union between a man and a woman exonerates 
the man from responsibility for his criminal conduct in assaulting' 
her: they have gone further and said that the fact of there being, or
once having been, "love* between the two people, notwithstanding the 
irregularity of their relationship, washes Violence against wives of 
most of its moral blameworthiness. Indeed, the courts have actually 
held that this factor Should be specifically taken into account in 
giving sentence and operates to lessen the man's guilt. ^3 A man's 
actions are thus held less reprehensible because they are perpetrated 
upon one who "loves" (or Used to loVe) him, almost as if her "love" 
for him washes away the Wrongfulness of his actions. Hence the legal 
institutions that deter people from taking advantage of each other 
generally do not welcome complaints by Women who fall victims of their 
husbands’/boyfriends' physical violence. This is also, perhaps, the 
reason why when it is the husband who is expected to protect his wife 
who in fact turns out to be her assailant the question currently posed 
by the judiciary is hot Whether ot hot it Was right for the husband to^ 
do so, but whether or not she has paid the obedience and fidelity due 
to the husband as a quid pro quo for his expected protection. ^4 
With respect, there does not seem to be a reasonable reason for 
holding that the existence, of a "domestic" or "pseudo-domestic" 
relationship between the parties lessens the moral guilt of the man.
If anything, it should perhaps be Used to exacerbate his
blameworthiness because he has abused the trtist vested in him.
D. REFUSAL TO TAKE JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES
Violence against wives is a problem that is legally very
inarticulate. The judges, while recognizing the criminality of
50. Chapter 238 of The Laws of Zimbabwe.
51. See, for instance, Marla ZhUwanklnyU V Samuel Dangarembwa,
JC21/40.
52. Except the right to maintenance in terms of s. 12 of the 
Customary Law and Primary Courts Act 6/81.
53. See for instance, Ruvengo Horwe v The State HC-H-311-86.
54. See, for instance, S v Mdindela, 1977 (3) S.A. 371 (OPD).
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violence against wives, have apparently ohly paid lip-service to It ^5 
and have generally not allowed themselves the luxury of speaking out 
or acting against It even In the more shocking of cases. Because 
women's perception of violence against wives and their response to it 
are already coloured by their being products of a society which sees 
some form of violence against wives as the existential condition of 
marriage, analysing cases involving women who have sought the court's 
intervention or whose cases have been brought to the court by some 
third party is examining court response to violence which is generally 
seen as having gone beyond the norm. Because of this fact it is 
perhaps reasonable to expect the judiciary to speak out against the 
violence and yet the Maboreke study, supra, reports that in none of 
the cases analysed therein had the court reprimanded the husbands 
concerned regardless of the extent/gravity of the assault. To this 
indictment one could answer that it is not the court's function to 
distinguish between good and bad, that it is the court's duty to 
deliver legal judgments not moralisahions, that if violence against 
wives is a social problem then it is problem for society at large 
because courts concern themselves With legal issues, and that, 
especially in relation to civil Cases, courts do not take- up Violence 
as an issue because it is hot raised as an issue before them. First, 
it is not always easy to axe the legal from the Social because the 
relationship between, them is dialectic. Second, although in some' 
cases, and perhaps the majority of cases at that, the Courts could, 
and- perhaps should, have taken judicial cognizance of the violence and 
given it weight in their decisions and orders/sentences, it is by no 
means argued that they should, or could, have done so in every caBe. 
Rather, the point is the kind of expectations one should have of the 
judiciary in this respect, viz, whether the law should passively 
reflect societal values or whether it should act as an active social 
steering instrument guiding society towards a desired goal. In all 
the cases analysed In connection with this article the courts could 
have made a moral stand on the issue Of violehce against wives. After 
ill, this would not have been the first time that the judicial 
fraternity had a made moral and policy stand on a social issue. They 
have done so and contihue to do so in relation to drug abuse, 
infanticide, dissident activity and the rape of girls by their fathers 
Dr other relatives or acquaintances, to name only a few. That the 
oourts do not adopt such an approach in relation to violence against 
wives is an indication of judicial triviallzatlon of this kind of 
violence and at least partly explains the veil of invisibility which 
seems to shroud physical violence while the courts go about their duty 
Df adjudicating upon cases in which violence against wives features. 
The courts have also apparently refused to 'take judicial cognizance of 
violence against wives in other actions. An illustrative case is 
hucheno v Shimbi. -5® This was a child custody case. When the wife 
was pregnant with thiB child her husband assaulted her so severely 
that she had taken refuge with her natural family. Also as a result 
3f the assault she had given birth prematurely and • all the 
responsibilities consequent upon this had of necessity devolved upon 
the woman's father. The court ga-ve custody of this child to its 
Eather. Admittedly the customary law relating to the custody of
>5. For example Hucheno V Shimbi and Masango 1936 SRN 83; Mucheno 
v Chisamba and Chisamba, 1940 S R 1940 S R  157; S v Mdlndela 
1977 (3) SA 322.
56 1936 SRN 83
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children Is not premised upon the guilt prinaple but on the payment of 
lobola subject to the child's welfare. 57 gut is aiEO trite that 
lobola' also serves as a guarantee of the good behaviour of the 
parties. The court in the instant case had apparently accepted that 
an award of custody to the mother would not have been prejudicial to 
the child's welfare. Therefore the court could have legitimately 
registered its disapproval of the father's conduct in assaulting his 
heavily pregnant) wife'(especially since the child involved was the one 
whom the wife had been pregnant with at the time) by awarding custody 
to the mother. But it did not do this. Instead the court treated the 
assaults as being irrelevant to the custody question.
7. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
There has apparently been an almost global awakening to violence 
against wives as a problem of not only legal but also social 
significance. 58 Moves to arrest the problem legislatively and 
socially have been made. Commendable laws have been passed, refuges 
and telephone hotlines, mediation centres and other referral 
institutions have been established. However, the experiences of those 
jurisdictions which are in the forefront of the battle against 
violence against wives indicate that the enactment of favourable legal 
provisions is largely meaningless unless backed by a positive attitude 
on the part of those institutions charged with implementing the 
provisions. Further, the continued high incidence of violence against 
wives in these jurisdiction bespeaks the complexity and 
multi-dimensionality of this problem and UhderliheS the need for 
eradicative longer-lasting solutions.
Some see violence as just another manifestation of men's 
domination over women. 59 Others believe that husbands become 
violent because they have either witnessed, or themselves been victims 
of intra-family violence during their child-hood, 60 because of 
their own psychopathology, or because they have drunk too much. 61 
Alternatively violence against wives is pefceived as a response to 
social pressures due to bad housing conditions, financial difficulties 
unemployment and a generally impoverished existence. 62 At times 
violence against wives is seen in terms of socialisation in a
57. See M. Maboreke, Chapters 3 and 4 (M. Phil); Maboreke in Women 
and the Law in Southern Africa, Armstrong (ed) Harare, Zimbabwe 
Publishing House.
58. See M. Maboreke, op clt, chapter 7.
59. Dobash and Dobash, (1980) Violence Against Wives; A case Against 
Patriarchy, London, Open Books.
60. Eng. J. Hayford, (1974) "Wifebattering: A Preliminary Survey of
100 cases,* British Medical Journal, p. 7; R. Gelles, (1974) The 
Violent Home: A Study of Physical Aggression Between Husbands
and Wives, Beverley Hills, Sage Publications.
61. E Pizzey, (1974) Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin.
62. British Association of Social Workers, "Working Party in Home
Violence: Discussion Document," Social Work Today, Vol.6.
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community which takes so^ie' types of violence for granted, ' Other
theorists see the violence aS“a result of provocation! by < the victim 
herself through her psychological need for domination, excitement or 
attention. 64 Yet others locate the cause of violence, in husbands' 
inability to live up! to the traditional stereotype of male 
superiority: the husband! might be an underachieverin' t education
employment, 65 he may be denied access to power and prestige outside 
the home and so resort to violence within the home to reassure himself 
that in this one sphere ^ t least he is "man" enough to remain in 
control, or he may find it difficult to come to terms with
superior achievements in jjifl wife; 67 but yet others conceptualize 
violence against wives as ! reflexive violence springing from, or 
related to, structural, violence. 68 Not a single one! of these 
theories satisfactorily explains why violence against wives;occurs and 
the very proliferation of theories seeking to explain it, as well as 
the almost global failure to successfully eradicate this problem show 
that there are no easy answers to the complex question^ tib^ ut the 
causes and solutions to this problems For instance, an examination of 
some of the Zimbabwean cases on violence against wives showS; that the 
reasons for such assaults are as many as they are varied. ! Women have 
been assaulted for suspected infidelity, 69 asking for a stronger say
in how the money they have earned should be spent, ^0 having, in the 
man's eyes "to be operated upon (Caesarean section) because she does 
not want to say her lovers," ^1 refusing to perjure themselves to
63. M.E. Wolfgang and F. Ferracutti, (1967) The Subculture of 
Violence: Towards An, Integrated Theory in Criminology, London, 
Associated Book Publishers.
64. Anthony Storr, (1968) Human Aggression, London, Allen Lane,
Penguin Press, E.Pizzey v ahd J. Shapiro, (1982) Prone to 
Violence, Feltham,<Mlddx, Hamlyn Paperbacks; M. Jobling, (1974) 
"Battered Wives: A Survey," Social Service Quarterly;. Vol 47.
65. J.E.O’Brien, (1971)i " Violence in Divorce - Prowls Families" 
Journal of Marriage And the Family, vol.33.
66. W.J. Goode, (1971) "Force and Violence in the Family," Journal 
of Marriage and the Family, vol 33.
67. M. Pagelow, . (197/) Battered Women: A New Perspective, Dublin, 
International Sociology Association.
68. David Gil, "Societal Violence in Family, Family. Violence: An
International and Interdisciplinary Study, op cit.
69. E.G. Mucheno v Chisamba and Chlsamba, 1940 SRN 157; Munemo v
Mandlyera and Sengeza, V943 SRN 261; Hazvlndl v Thomas Dhlamlni, 
Harare Community (36urt 257/85; Pauline Vera Mhambl v Clddlngs 
Mhambl, HC-H-56-86. *'■
70. Angellne Chiutsu v Pennies Garisa, 1969 CAACC 70.
71. Agatha Gada v Lovenlore Muchazivepi Harare Community Court
737/85: there is a general belief especially among the older
generation that a woman who gives birth by Caesarean ^section had 
been unfaithful and that an admission of her infidelity would 
enable her to have a natural birth. *
110 Z. L. Rev. Vol. 4 1986
save their husbands' skins, ?2 allegedly never having had sex with 
their husbands although the couple had had children together, 3^ 
refusing to listen to the bible being read to her by her husband 
because she was recuperating from having given birth four days 
earlier, 7^ objecting to the husband having sex with other women in 
the family car, ?5 refusing to wash the sheets which the husband had 
used when having sex with other women after he had forced the wife to 
sleep in the spare bedroom, 6^ claiming that the assailant is the 
father of her illegitimate child, ?? refusing to allow her boyfriend 
to stay the night with her because he had stopped supporting her 
financially, 7® and the wife returning home later than anticipated. 
^  And having one's own money has not always proved the panacea that 
it might otherwise have been thought to be. The ambiguities inherent 
in people's lives in general and the causal factors of violence 
against wives in particular thus defy neat and comfortable 
accommodation in any one theoretical explanation. All these 
shortcomings notwithstanding, however, all the theoretical 
explanations re violence against wives put together deepen and broaden 
understandings about the problem, and is ah indispensable tool in the 
search for a meaningful solution to the problem. Pethaps, therefore, 
the struggle for better and more effective protection for assaulted 
women should be fought on two fronts: with one Seeking ways of 
improving the protection actually available to victims of violence 
against wives within the confines of the current set up and the other 
pursuing the fight to understand the causal factors of this violence 
with a view to finding eradicative solutions to it.
An analysis of the strategies adopted by other jurisdiction also 
reveals, inter alia, an almost global reliance/dependence on refuges 
for victims of violence against wives, probably indicating a 
realisation that perhaps refuges offer the most immediately 
practicable solution to this particular species of violence. Refuges,
72. Florence Mushambi v Ishmael Mushambi Harare Community Court 
30/85j Constance Shonge v Newett Rudolf Shonge and Mrs Ruth 
Sifelani, HC-H-414-86.
73. Esther Kangai A/B Pedzai v Mairos Kangai, Harare Community
Court 549/85.
74. Elizabeth Hwarari v Naptuali Hwarari., Harare Community Court
549/85.
75. Sarah Masikati v Solomon Masikati, Harare Community Court
447/85; Zandile Ndhlovu v Never Ndhlovu Harare Community Court
284/85; Helen Chaniwa v Peter Chaniwa, HC-H-249-86; Constance
Shonge v Newett Rudolf Shonge and Mrs Ruth Sifelani, HC-H-414-86.
76. Douglas Yobe v Hazel Mabvuu, Harare Community Court 247/85.
77. Tecla Mazani v Benjamin Samanyanga JC 14/85; Martha Mashaba v
Martin Makuvaza, JC 103/85.
COI"*. Ruvengo Horwe v The State, HC-H-311-86.
79. The State v John Mushava, HC-H-366-86.
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however,though an Important and necessary first step are but an 
amelioratory band-aid measure. The fact that such refuges as have 
been established are always enrolled to capacity is probably
indicative of their limitation and a global failure at this stage to 
find a solution for violence against wives.
8. CONCLUSION
Close analysis of Cases involving violence against wives reveals 
decisions suggesting that some judicial officers do sometimes take 
note of violence against wives. However most cases show that judges 
have little regard for the plight of women who are beaten by their 
husbands or boyfriends. The problem needs careful deliberation by 
scholars and politicians! appropriate law reform and conscientious 
implementation of the law.
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